Trust & Certifications
An honest status board for the security team evaluating us. What is validated today, and what is still in progress or planned. We split the two on purpose: a reproducible test-vector pass is not a certification, and we never let one stand in for the other.
How to read this page
This page is written for a regulated buyer's security and compliance team. Every claim resolves to a file, a public reproducer, or a standard you can look up yourself. Where something is not yet done, we say so plainly and we do not imply a certification we do not hold. The single distinction that matters: "self-tested against NIST vectors" is not the same as "certified." The board below keeps those in separate columns.
Status board at a glance
| Item | Status | What it means |
|---|---|---|
| NIST ACVP test vectors | Validated | 18,703 pass / 0 fail, reproducible from a public harness. Test-vector validation, not FIPS 140-3 / CMVP. |
| Project Wycheproof | Validated | ~2,937 adversarial / reject-path vectors, 0 fail, on the shipped crates. |
| Hybrid PQC + hardened code | Validated | FIPS 203/204/205 algorithms + classical hybrid; parameterized SQL, constant-time compares, fail-closed auth. See /security. |
| Independent third-party crypto audit | Planned | Not yet commissioned. Current review is internal / automated only. |
| Penetration test | Planned | No third-party pen test has been performed yet. |
| SOC 2 Type II | Planned | Not achieved. Control platform / Type 1 not yet completed. |
| FIPS 140-3 / CMVP | Roadmap | Not validated. Not on the CMVP list. No application submitted to NIST as of this date. |
| HITRUST e1 (healthcare) | Roadmap | Not certified. Pursued when chasing healthcare buyers. |
| OS code-signing (Windows EV + Apple) | In progress | Internal ML-DSA-87 release signing ships today; CA-issued OS-trust certs are being procured. |
The two sections below give the precise, correctly-disclaimed detail behind each row.
Part A Validated today
Everything in this section is real, shipping, and reproducible right now. None of it is a regulatory certification, and we label each item with exactly what it is and is not.
NIST ACVP test-vector validation
18,703 of the attempted NIST ACVP test vectors pass, with 0 failures, against ACVP-Server v1.1.0.42 (commit 15c0f3deeefbfa8cb6cd32a99e1ca3b738c66bf0). The run covers 29,962 vectors in total, of which 11,259 are documented skips (vector classes outside QNSQY's algorithm scope, plus a small number of upstream-crate API gaps), each logged with a reason. 33 of 50 ACVP algorithm directories reach 100% NIST coverage, including ML-KEM keyGen, ML-DSA keyGen and sigVer, SLH-DSA across all 12 parameter sets, SHA-2, SHAKE-128 (FIPS 202), HMAC, and X25519.
This is byte-for-byte replay of NIST's published test vectors against the exact Rust crates the shipping binary links. The harness is fully public and contains zero proprietary product code, so anyone can re-derive the result: clone NIST's vector tree at the pinned commit, run the harness, and confirm the 18,703 / 0 / 11,259 / 29,962 line. Full per-vector log, per-directory totals, and reproducer on the Validation page.
This is test-vector validation, not certification.
ACVP test-vector replay is the algorithm-correctness component a CMVP-accredited lab would consult. It is not a FIPS 140-3 / CMVP validation, not a NIST certification or endorsement (NIST does not certify products), and not a substitute for accredited-lab (CSTL) testing. QNSQY is not on the NIST CMVP Validated Modules list and we do not claim to be. The surrounding module boundary, roles, self-tests, and operational requirements have not been independently evaluated.
Project Wycheproof adversarial vectors
ACVP proves QNSQY computes the correct answer on valid input. Google's Project Wycheproof proves the other half: that bad input is rejected. QNSQY runs the official Project Wycheproof v1 adversarial vectors on every build. Roughly 2,937 vectors execute with 0 failures on the shipped crates. The vectors exercise the reject paths that matter: tampered AES-GCM authentication tags, malleable Ed25519 signatures, malformed public keys, and twisted-curve points. Each harness fails the build if any valid vector is rejected, any invalid vector is accepted, or zero vectors run, so a pass is a real result.
This is also test-vector replay, not a certification.
Like the ACVP sweep, this is byte-for-byte replay against the production crates QNSQY ships. It is a strong, reproducible signal that the primitives accept what they should and reject what they should. It is not a NIST, CMVP, or FIPS 140-3 certification.
Hybrid PQC & hardened code
QNSQY ships hybrid post-quantum cryptography: NIST-standardized algorithms (FIPS 203 ML-KEM, FIPS 204 ML-DSA, FIPS 205 SLH-DSA) composed with classical X25519 and Ed25519, so an adversary must break both the post-quantum and the classical primitive to compromise your data. FN-DSA (Falcon) ships at the Business tier under draft FIPS 206 and is labelled draft.
The application and edge surfaces are hardened, and verified in a security review of the codebase: all database access is parameterized with bound queries (dynamic sorts use allowlists, not string interpolation), secret-dependent comparisons (HMAC, tokens, key material) are constant-time, and authentication is fail-closed: on missing or ambiguous input the system refuses rather than guesses, and admin routes require step-up auth (password plus mandatory TOTP). No hardcoded secrets exist in the worker, site, or CI surface. Full detail of the cryptographic and hardening architecture is on /security.
Part B In progress & planned
The items below are not yet achieved. We list them so a buyer knows exactly where the gaps are. Where work has started we say so; where it has not, we say that too. None of these should be read as a current certification.
Independent third-party cryptographic audit
We have not commissioned an independent third-party cryptographic audit yet, and there is no published independent audit of QNSQY. Our current review is internal and automated only (repeated multi-agent code reviews and a documented codebase security review), which is useful but is not the same as a named external firm signing a report. Engaging a specialist crypto firm (the type of report regulated buyers ask for first) is planned and funded from our raise. We will publish the report when it exists; until then we make no independent-audit claim.
Penetration test
No third-party penetration test has been performed yet. A pen test is typically required alongside SOC 2 and is planned as part of that effort. When it is complete we will summarize scope, findings, and remediation here.
SOC 2 Type II
QNSQY is not SOC 2 certified. We have not yet completed a SOC 2 Type 1 or stood up a compliance-automation platform, both of which precede a Type II observation window. Our hosted billing API and organization / SSO features would be the in-scope surface. This is an early roadmap item; status will be updated here as it progresses.
FIPS 140-3 / CMVP
QNSQY is not FIPS 140-3 validated and is not listed on the NIST Cryptographic Module Validation Program. No application has been submitted to NIST as of this date. Our ACVP work (Part A) is the CAVP algorithm-correctness head start a CMVP path is built on, but the full path (CAVP algorithm certs, an NVLAP-accredited CST lab engagement, and the Modules-In-Process queue) is a 12-to-24-month effort we have not begun. We pursue this when chasing US federal and defense buyers, for whom it is effectively mandatory.
HITRUST e1 (for healthcare)
QNSQY is not HITRUST certified. HITRUST e1 (the entry tier of the HITRUST CSF, the certifiable framework healthcare buyers actually ask for) is on the roadmap, pursued when we engage healthcare customers. Note separately: HIPAA is a law you self-attest to and support with a BAA, not a certification; our hash-chain audit log already targets the 45 CFR 164.312(b) audit-controls requirement, but the encryption decision and any HIPAA determination remain the customer's auditor's call.
OS code-signing (Windows EV + Apple notarization)
QNSQY already performs ML-DSA-87 (FIPS 204) release signing internally for supply-chain integrity, and Linux packages ship a SHA-256 manifest plus an embedded post-quantum binary signature. That gives cryptographic build provenance, but it is not OS-level publisher trust. CA-issued Windows EV code-signing (for SmartScreen reputation) and Apple Developer notarization (for macOS Gatekeeper) require certificates we are in the process of procuring. Until those are in place, installers may show an unknown-publisher warning on Windows and macOS; verify downloads against the published signatures in the meantime.
No claim of independent audit or certification.
To be unambiguous: as of this date QNSQY has no independent third-party cryptographic audit, no penetration test, and no SOC 2, FIPS 140-3 / CMVP, HITRUST, or ISO 27001 certification. The validation in Part A is reproducible test-vector evidence, not a regulatory certification. We will move each item from "planned" to "validated" only when it is genuinely complete, and link the artifact here.
Next steps for your security team
For the cryptographic and hardening architecture in depth, see the Security page. For source read access, a draft DPA, or to discuss a certification timeline against your procurement requirements, contact us directly, we would rather have the honest conversation than oversell.